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《清华知识产权评论》2015年第1期(总第1期)-我国通知移除制度失效的现实考察及对策思考

我国通知移除制度失效的现实考察及对策思考

徐  伟*


【摘要】经验事实表明,我国为应对网络侵权而创设的通知移除制度并未能有效抑制网络侵权现象。通知移除制度失效的重要原因之一在于网络服务提供者基于自身利益的考虑而对该制度采取了“选择性守法”态度。选择性守法现象的出现根源于通知移除制度本身存在的违背基本程序正义原则的设计缺陷。而此种制度设计的产生,又源于互联网技术的特点对传统法律救济途径造成的冲击。为了避免通知移除制度失效,可从扭转网络对传统法律救济途径的影响、改变通知移除制度的设计缺陷以及扩大网络服务提供者的违法成本等方面加以考虑。
  【关键词】通知移除制度,网络服务提供者,网络侵权,选择性守法,成本收益分析



Empirical Analysis on Ineffective Notice and Takedown Regime

and It’s Countermesaures
Xu Wei


Abstract: Empirical facts shows that the notice and takedown regime which is created for preventing internet tort doesn’t achieve its legislation aim effectively. This phenomenon happens on account of that the internet service providers (ISPs) take selective law-abiding attitude which is formulated in the interest of them. The existing of this selective law-abiding owns to the system defect of notice and takedown regime, that is, it violates the principles of procedural justice. Furthermore, this system defect originates from that the traditional legal relief manner has been changed significantly in the internet phenomenon. To perfect the notice and takedown regime, three approaches can be considered: firstly, change the impacts of internet to the legal relief manner; secondly, alter the system defect of notice and takedown regime; and thirdly, raise the cost of law breaking.
Keywords: notice and takedown regime, internet service provider; internet infringement; selective law-abiding; cost-benefit analysis


我国通知移除制度失效的现实考察及对策思考.pdf